Link-Denial Tripwire: Own-Channel Jam Detection
Notices the moment the sensors stop hearing, and says which room went quiet.
Feasibility path · not a production offer
This offer is scoped to this capability only. It does not promote sibling catalog entries or replace physical deployment validation.
Contested Space · Contested capability
Latent emits a reading. It does not switch cameras, unlock cages, cut power or open a ticket. Your VMS, PoE switch or access controller does that, on your side of the boundary. A Latent blueprint contains no executable code, no remote URLs and no device secrets — by schema, not by policy.
No face, no plate, no MAC, no device identity, no payload. A movement signature is a shape moving through a room, not a person. Nothing stored here resolves to an individual.
A jammer that stays below the escalation threshold of your baseline is invisible, and a jammer already running when the baseline was taken is written into “normal”. The baseline must be captured in a verified-quiet window; a baseline of unknown provenance is worth nothing.
Across Airspace A jammer already running when you took the baseline is invisible. The baseline must be captured in a verified-quiet window, and a baseline of unknown provenance is worth nothing.
Each node mints its own key over USB, in your hand. Physical possession is the root authority: a device that cannot prove physical presence is refused enrollment outright. A cloud pairing PIN is a weaker ownership claim and is never treated as liveness.
Every reading is attributable to a device id, profile id, hardware id and firmware version recorded at install and verified by mutual HMAC-SHA256 proof over an LFW1 nonce exchange. A node whose proof did not verify is marked untrusted, not merely offline.
Completing an installation is a high-risk action. It requires your explicit browser approval, an approval snapshot that still matches, an idempotency key, and heartbeats less than three minutes old. There is no silent commissioning.
How enrollment worksProperties you can map to your own controls
These are properties, not certifications. Latent does not assert compliance with any framework on your behalf.
Mapped to a shared offline runtime family and usable with a recording or compatible ESP32 CSI stream.
Published physics or adjacent results support the hypothesis; capability-specific product and site validation are still required.
Collapse of the node’s own CSI stream and received power against a learned baseline. This is evidence that one link on one 20 MHz channel went deaf — never attacker identification, and never a claim about any other band.
No compatible ESP32 stream is connected. Use the bundled Airspace recording; it demonstrates the shared Link denial runtime, not independent proof of this capability.
Intended capability
This describes the intended outcome. Readiness is shared-family mapped, evidence is class B, and a catalog mapping or recording is not proof of this outcome at a real site.
Solution blueprint
This exact kit is one of 191 first-class designs. It includes geometry, objects, nodes, wording, scenarios, installation, limitations, and catalog-bound readiness.
No rendered revision is available yet.
Bundled recording
This is one recorded vertical scenario. It is not separate validation of every capability in the catalog.
An ESP32-S3 has no spectrum analyzer and does not need one to notice it has gone deaf. Interference or jamming on the 20 MHz channel the node occupies destroys frames before they demodulate, so the count of successfully received frames per second falls while received power on the frames that do survive holds or rises. Rate and power moving apart is the jam signature; rate falling with power falling is a link that simply walked out of range.
On-node frame inter-arrival timing (measured directly from the receive stream, never from the reported sampling rate) + received-power series -> adaptive PCA baseline over the node's own verified-quiet rate/power history -> CUSUM on the rate-collapse residual gated by power direction -> multi-node corroboration count -> compartment attribution to the largest-deficit node's named room -> on radar-equipped nodes, the radar's presence verdict over its serial line annotates the event row with occupied/empty for the denial window.
This is a capability design path. Components may be shared with other catalog entries; it is not presented as a unique algorithm.
Own-hardware: six-node bench mesh on one channel, baselined across a verified-quiet hour, then degraded with a co-channel saturating transmitter and separately with a microwave oven at rising duty cycle; report detection latency, false-page rate against the oven, and the corroboration count at which benign interference stops paging. CSI-Bench for rate/power feature stability under interference; no public dataset covers jamming at this hardware class, so this trial is the evidence.
'Deaf Node' — for the netsec lead who logs every login and nothing about the air: a per-room tripwire that fires the moment the mesh loses reception, sold on the understanding that it reports one channel's health and says nothing about who caused it.
A quiet reading is not an all-clear. If nodes are stale, degraded or jammed, this runtime says so explicitly. It never infers safety from missing data.