All capabilities
Camera Shield & Cage Watch Shared-family mapped

Jammed is not blind

Jam-Time Sentinel

Even while the radios are being drowned out, a wired node keeps saying whether a body is in the aisle, and about how far along.

Contested Space · Contested capability

What this capability does not do.

Does not act.

Latent emits a reading. It does not switch cameras, unlock cages, cut power or open a ticket. Your VMS, PoE switch or access controller does that, on your side of the boundary. A Latent blueprint contains no executable code, no remote URLs and no device secrets — by schema, not by policy.

Does not identify.

No face, no plate, no MAC, no device identity, no payload. A movement signature is a shape moving through a room, not a person. Nothing stored here resolves to an individual.

Does not survive everything.

Cuts to copper or host power end the feed — silence on the wired path is its own top-severity alarm. Cones cover declared aisles only; a 24 GHz interferer (another FMCW radar) can degrade it and must be alarmed as radar-band interference, never ignored.

Across Camera Shield Jam the mesh and the wake never fires. Two people moving together read as one disturbance. Re-rack a row and the fade map is wrong until you recalibrate.

Observable
Collapse of the node’s own CSI frame rate against a rolling baseline, corroborated by received power on the protected 20 MHz channel.
Retention
Event rows: which node went deaf, when, and by how much. No IQ capture, no payload, no attacker identity, and no claim about any other band.
Node minimum
2 nodes
Export policy
Conditional — Exportable into a signed release, subject to the deployment’s own preflight.
Chain of custody

Node identity

Each node mints its own key over USB, in your hand. Physical possession is the root authority: a device that cannot prove physical presence is refused enrollment outright. A cloud pairing PIN is a weaker ownership claim and is never treated as liveness.

Reading provenance

Every reading is attributable to a device id, profile id, hardware id and firmware version recorded at install and verified by mutual HMAC-SHA256 proof over an LFW1 nonce exchange. A node whose proof did not verify is marked untrusted, not merely offline.

Install attestation

Completing an installation is a high-risk action. It requires your explicit browser approval, an approval snapshot that still matches, an idempotency key, and heartbeats less than three minutes old. There is no silent commissioning.

How enrollment works

Properties you can map to your own controls

  • No optical sensor is present in this capability’s node set.
  • Raw CSI does not leave the node. Only derived event rows are stored or exported.
  • No stored identifier resolves to a person. Where access events are correlated, that correlation happens in your systems, against your logs.
  • The runtime executes on the node and in your browser. This capability has no cloud inference path.

These are properties, not certifications. Latent does not assert compliance with any framework on your behalf.

A capability description, not an incident record.
Readiness Shared-family mapped

Mapped to a shared offline runtime family and usable with a recording or compatible ESP32 CSI stream.

Evidence Strong theory Supported hypothesis

Published physics or adjacent results support the hypothesis; capability-specific product and site validation are still required.

Runtime family Link denial

Collapse of the node’s own CSI stream and received power against a learned baseline. This is evidence that one link on one 20 MHz channel went deaf — never attacker identification, and never a claim about any other band.

When no ESP32 is connected

No compatible ESP32 stream is connected. Use the bundled Camera Shield recording; it demonstrates the shared Link denial runtime, not independent proof of this capability.

Intended capability

Pilot this intended outcome through the shared Link denial family, then validate it against site-specific ground truth: During active 2.4 GHz denial of the protected estate, an aisle-aimed radar on a copper-cabled node keeps producing presence-and-range verdicts and reports them over the wired failover — converting a jam from 'we are blind, page on silence' into 'jammed, and a body is holding at gate 3'.

This describes the intended outcome. Readiness is shared-family mapped, evidence is class B, and a catalog mapping or recording is not proof of this outcome at a real site.

Solution blueprint

See the environment before installing it.

This exact kit is one of 191 first-class designs. It includes geometry, objects, nodes, wording, scenarios, installation, limitations, and catalog-bound readiness.

Shared-family mapped

No rendered revision is available yet.

Bundled recording

A related Camera Shield scene

This is one recorded vertical scenario. It is not separate validation of every capability in the catalog.

01 The physics

24 GHz FMCW shares no propagation medium or protocol with 2.4 GHz WiFi, so RF denial of the mesh has no mechanism against it; the LD2410C's UART verdicts reach the host over the existing copper-failover path the jammer also cannot touch. Coverage is one in-room cone per radar, stated on the box.

02 Shared processing path

Estate jam/silence verdict -> cabled node promotes LD2410 stream to primary -> presence + range-gate verdicts over copper failover -> live 'jammed but sensing' state to the operator with per-gate position

This is a capability design path. Components may be shared with other catalog entries; it is not presented as a unique algorithm.

03 Validation plan

Estate-scale drill: sustained denial of the mesh while movers traverse covered aisles; verdict latency and range attribution verified end-to-end over copper; graceful degradation confirmed when the copper host is down.

04 Commercial hypothesis

'Jammed is not blind' — for datacenter security owners whose response plan needs live position during the exact attack that kills their cameras.

A quiet reading is not an all-clear. If nodes are stale, degraded or jammed, this runtime says so explicitly. It never infers safety from missing data.