Deauth Storm Sentinel: Management-Frame Flood Watch
Catches the flood of kick-off messages that is what most 'camera jamming' actually is.
Contested Space · Contested capability
Latent emits a reading. It does not switch cameras, unlock cages, cut power or open a ticket. Your VMS, PoE switch or access controller does that, on your side of the boundary. A Latent blueprint contains no executable code, no remote URLs and no device secrets — by schema, not by policy.
No face, no plate, no MAC, no device identity, no payload. A movement signature is a shape moving through a room, not a person. Nothing stored here resolves to an individual.
A jammer already running when you took the baseline is invisible. The baseline must be captured in a verified-quiet window, and a baseline of unknown provenance is worth nothing.
Each node mints its own key over USB, in your hand. Physical possession is the root authority: a device that cannot prove physical presence is refused enrollment outright. A cloud pairing PIN is a weaker ownership claim and is never treated as liveness.
Every reading is attributable to a device id, profile id, hardware id and firmware version recorded at install and verified by mutual HMAC-SHA256 proof over an LFW1 nonce exchange. A node whose proof did not verify is marked untrusted, not merely offline.
Completing an installation is a high-risk action. It requires your explicit browser approval, an approval snapshot that still matches, an idempotency key, and heartbeats less than three minutes old. There is no silent commissioning.
How enrollment worksProperties you can map to your own controls
These are properties, not certifications. Latent does not assert compliance with any framework on your behalf.
The evidence is proven or strong, but this capability still needs a capability-specific ESP32 or Rust runtime adapter.
Published physics or adjacent results support the hypothesis; capability-specific product and site validation are still required.
No browser runtime is assigned to this capability yet.
No capability-specific offline runtime is mapped yet. Keep the feature visible, explain the required edge adapter, and never fabricate a live result.
Intended capability
This describes the intended outcome. Readiness is needs edge adapter, evidence is class B, and a catalog mapping or recording is not proof of this outcome at a real site.
Solution blueprint
This exact kit is one of 191 first-class designs. It includes geometry, objects, nodes, wording, scenarios, installation, limitations, and catalog-bound readiness.
No rendered revision is available yet.
Bundled recording
This is one recorded vertical scenario. It is not separate validation of every capability in the catalog.
Deauth and disassoc are unencrypted management frames on the same channel as the data traffic they attack, so a promiscuous receiver parked on that channel counts them directly — no inference, no model, just frames. Their per-frame RSSI across the mesh gives the same node-ranking constraint that localizes any other emitter, which is what turns a count into a zone.
Promiscuous management-frame capture on watched channels -> rate and source/target fan-out counters per window -> threshold on rate AND fan-out jointly (mass roaming after an AP reboot trips rate alone) -> MVE zone attribution over per-frame RSSI ranking -> bounded event row with counts, channel and zone -> on the opt-in evidence tier, the storm verdict plus zone gates one bounded local snapshot of the strongest-injection zone.
This is a capability design path. Components may be shared with other catalog entries; it is not presented as a unique algorithm.
Blocked on the link-stats host import that exposes management-frame counters to the edge module. Own-hardware plan: three nodes on the camera VLAN's channel, scripted deauth floods at four rates against two targets, plus an AP reboot to generate legitimate mass roaming; report detection latency, injection-zone accuracy, and the false-page rate across a week of normal roaming.
'Storm Sentinel' — the attack this vertical's own threat story names, caught by the cheapest sensor in the catalog, sold to the netsec lead with the channel-coverage trade printed on the box: watching more channels costs either more nodes or scan duty taken from the sensing mesh.
A quiet reading is not an all-clear. If nodes are stale, degraded or jammed, this runtime says so explicitly. It never infers safety from missing data.